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Ludwig von Mises (1881-1973) baptized the idea that the gain of some is caused by the loss 
of others as the “Montaigne dogma.” Mises considered the fallacy to be very widespread and 
sufficiently noteworthy that he devoted chapter 24 of his magnum opus Human Action to 
refuting the idea. Casto Martín Montero Kuscevic and Marco Antonio del Río Rivera (2015) 
discuss Mises´ refutation of Montainge´s dogma and claim that he misinterpreted Montaigne 
on fundamental grounds. They make the further claim that Mises misattributed the dogma to 
Montaigne. In this short response, we assess their argument to demonstrate that a more 
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complete reading of Mises’s arguments vindicate both his identification and criticisms of the 
Montaigne dogma.  
Montaigne´s brief chapter 21 of his Essays is titled “Le profit de l´un est dommage de 
l´autre” (The profit of one man is the damage of another). The chapter begins:  
 
Demades, the Athenian…condemned one of his city, whose trade it was to sell the 
necessaries for funeral ceremonies, upon pretence that he demanded unreasonable 
profits and that that profit could not accrue to him, but by the death of a great number 
of people. A judgment that appears to be ill grounded, forasmuch as no profit whatever 
can possibly be made but at the expense of another, and that by the same rule he 
should condemn all gain of what kind so ever. The merchant only thrives by the 
debauchery of youth, the husband man by the dearness of grain, the architect by the 
ruin of buildings, lawyers and officers of justice by the suits and contentions of men: 
nay, even the honour and office of divines are derived from our death and vices. (Vol. 
3, pp. 112-13) 
It is the sweeping and general statement that “no profit whatever can possibly be made 
but at the expense of another” that is the heart of Montaigne´s dogma.1 In a section cited by 
Montero Kuscevic and del Río Rivera, Ludwig von Mises writes that:  
 
[t]he changes in the data whose reiterated emergence prevents the economic system 
from turning into an evenly rotating economy and produces again and again 
entrepreneurial profit and loss are favorable to some members of society and 
unfavorable to others. Hence, people concluded, the gain of one man is the damage of 
another; no man profits but by the loss of others. This dogma was already advanced 
                                                        
1 The Montaigne dogma lies at the heart of mercantilism (Mises 1949, p. 660; Rothbard 2006, p. 203). Benegas 
Lynch (1981, pp. 275-303) refers to this dogma in the field of international relations. Montero Kuscevic and del 
Río Rivera are correct, however, that the dogma is the basis of many types of socialism. 
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by some ancient authors. Among modern writers Montaigne was the first to restate it; 
we may fairly call it the Montaigne dogma. (1949, p. 660) 
 
Montero Kuscevic and del Río Rivera argue that by imputing the dogma to Montaigne, Mises 
committed one injustice and made two mistakes.  
The first alleged mistake of Mises was not taking into account the time in which 
Montaigne lived. Montaigne lived from 1533-1588, a violent time. Knecht (2002, p. 91) 
estimates that two to four million French citizens died during the country´s Wars of Religion 
of 1562-98. During Montaigne´s time, life had little value, there was no concept of equality 
under the law and the Industrial Revolution had not yet begun. Montero Kuscevic and del Río 
Rivera (pp. 339-40) maintain that in the hierarchical society that Montaigne lived in “it was 
quite normal to think that the wealth of the powerful was based on the poverty of their 
subjects.” There are several problems with this line of argument.  
First, Montero Kuscevic and del Río Rivera interpret the historical context as being 
favorable to their argument and maintain that Mises did not take into account that life had 
little value in Montaigne´s time. Presumably Montero Kuscevic and del Río Rivera object that 
Mises mistakenly applied the standards of his time to Montaigne´s. However, Mises did not 
exactly live in trouble-free times either. He lived through the two World Wars, which were 
also very violent and cruel.2 In other ways, Montaigne’s time was actually much more 
civilized than Montero Kuscevic and del Río Rivera give credit to. The idea of equality under 
the law had been known since ancient times, something that would not have been hidden to a 
classical scholar such as Montaigne. Indeed, the first public announcement of the idea was 
made in 431 BCE by Pericles: “If we look to the laws, they afford equal justice to all in their 
private differences; if no social standing, advancement in public life falls to reputation for 
                                                        
2 Mises was affected personally by this difficult period of European history. He served as a front officer in the 
Austro-Hungarian artillery during World War I and, as a Jew, fled the advancing German army for the United 
States in 1940.  
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capacity, class considerations not being allowed to interfere with merit; nor again does 
poverty bar the way” (Thucydides 1874). Furthermore, while capitalism had not fully 
developed, the first fairs in France, among them the famous Champagne Fairs, were well-
organized by the start of the 12th century (Milgrom et al. 1990). In short, there were well-
developed markets and plenty of voluntary exchanges in Montaigne´s time. The times during 
which Montaigne lived were, in many important ways, not so different to Mises´s as Montero 
Kuscevic and del Río Rivera suppose.3 
Second, Montaigne is not talking about the “wealth of the powerful” and the “poverty 
of their subjects” but rather of profit (or gain) and loss, which are not analogous concepts. 
Profit or gain has no univocal relation to material wealth. Consider a billionaire who transfers 
a large part of his wealth to a private foundation in exchange for voting rights, or even as an 
act of philanthropy. His wealth will be reduced but he will have earned an entrepreneurial 
profit, e.g., through prestige or from the esteem of his fellow citizens. 
Third, and most importantly, it is seems that Montero Kuscevic and del Río Rivera 
want to maintain that Montaigne only wanted to apply his “dogma” to instances where 
someone applies violence to oppress others, i.e., involuntary exchanges. This interpretation is 
quite dubious. In his examples, Montaigne almost exclusively refers to voluntary exchanges. 
He invokes cases involving merchants, architects, physicians, and lawyers, all civil 
professions. The only case that can be interpreted as violent in nature is the one involving a 
soldier. Even in this example is it not clear that this is an oppressive relationship as this form 
of violence can be explained as self-defense or as an important service sold on the market. 
Most importantly, Montaigne´s statement that “the profit of one man is the damage of 
another” is universal. It clearly applies to all exchanges, voluntary and involuntary. Mises 
                                                        
3 In any case, even if one agreed that Montaigne´s times were less civil than Mises´s, his particular life was not. 
Born to a wealthy family, Montaigne studied at the prestigious Collège de Guyenne boarding school in 
Bordeaux.  Notwithstanding the turbulent times that Montaigne lived, he was respected by both the Catholic 
King Henry III and the Protestant Henry of Navarre. Mises too was born of a wealthy family, though he was 
forced to live in direct contact with the conflicts of his time (see footnote 2 above).   
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acknowledges that Montaigne is correct even for some voluntary exchanges, and uses the 
example of new money being introduced into the economy claiming that Cantillon effects will 
benefit some at the cost of others (Mises 1949, p. 660). When new gold was mined during the 
gold standard, those who spent it took advantage of existing prices which were then increased, 
thus imposing an increased cost on later recipients. All transactions are voluntary.4  
Mises confines his criticisms of Montaigne´s claim to the context of voluntary 
exchanges, namely in the market economy. Chapter 24 of Human Action is from the 4th 
section of the book, which bears the title “Catallactis or Economics of the Market Society”. 
Following the quotation provided by Montero Kuscevic and del Río Rivera (cited earlier) 
Mises writes (p. 660-61):  
 
What produces a man´s profit in the course of affairs within an unhampered market 
society is not his fellow citizen´s plight and distress, but the fact that he alleviates or 
entirely removes what causes his fellow citizen´s feeling of unhappiness…There are in 
the market economy no conflicts between the interests of the buyers and sellers.  
Mises clearly agrees with Montaigne in regard with involuntary exchanges:  
The statement that one man´s boon is the other man´s damage is valid with regard to 
robbery, war, and booty. The robber´s plunder is the damage of the despoiled victim. 
But war and commerce are two different things. (p. 662) 
 
Montaigne´s fault was precisely to believe that in war and commerce one man´s gain is 
another man´s loss. In contrast Mises clearly distinguishes between the two, and relates 
                                                        
4 In a fiat standard one could claim that the introduction of new money involves an involuntary exchange. The 
demand for fiat money is enforced by legal tender laws and the government’s powers of taxation coerce 
individuals and businesses to acquire its currency. Moreover, the supply of base money under a fiat regime is 
typically granted to a state-sanctioned monopolist, the central bank. The introduction of new fiat money involves 
a similar type of redistribution as in a gold standard although in the former case we are arguably not faced with 
voluntary exchanges in a free market since fiat money is supported by the coercive powers of government. 
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Montaigne´s dogma exclusively to voluntary exchanges. Changes caused “by force and fraud” 
(Montero Kuscevic and del Río Rivera, p. 337) are outside the context Mises is discussing.  
Montero Kuscevic and del Río Rivera do not distinguish clearly between acts of war 
and commerce. Montaigne´s claim holds in war settings. As Montero Kuscevic and del Río 
Rivera correctly point out, Rome´s victory is Carthage´s loss. Beside the example of Rome 
and Carthage, Montero Kuscevic and del Río Rivera provide other apt examples of situations 
in which one individual´s gain is another´s loss, e,g., in court one party wins at the cost of the 
other, and in sports the winner´s gain is the others´ loss.  
Courts and sports are voluntary exchanges that form part of an unhampered market. If 
Montero Kuscevic and del Río Rivera are correct, these examples would show that 
Montaigne´s dogma could be applied equally well to such exchanges. Yet, one has to 
distinguish between ex ante and ex post evaluations. Ex post an actor may always 
demonstrate that any action or exchange has created a loss. Ex ante, however, all parties to 
voluntary exchanges expect to benefit. As Mises (1949, p. 662) puts it: “If both the buyer and 
the seller were not to consider the transaction as the most advantageous action they could 
choose under the prevailing conditions, they would not enter into the deal.”  
Therefore, Montaigne´s dogma is misapplied even in cases such as sports and courts. 
People go to court because they prefer the judicial settlement of their conflicts to alternatives.5 
Similarly, individuals participate in sporting events because they prefer to play even if they 
may not be declared victor. Their choice is between participating and not participating. If they 
prefer to participate, they demonstrate by their action that they expect to gain. (Later, they 
may regret their action but this is beside the point.) 
Montero Kuscevic and del Río Rivera try to defend Montaigne by claiming that 
human life not only involves transformation of nature but often also the destruction of other 
                                                        
5 Alternatively, the defendant is obliged to go to court at the will of the accuser, in which case we would no 
longer be faced with a voluntary transaction.  
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forms of life. As Montaigne puts it: “the birth, nourishment, and increase of every thing is the 
dissolution and corruption of another” (1877, p. 113). 
It is true that the cutting down of trees to build houses and killing animals to satisfy 
hunger or to make clothes implies the killing of living beings (Montero Kuscevic and del Río 
Rivera, p. 339). But these lives are not of humans, but of plants and animals. If Montaigne has 
stated that “one man´s gain, is sometimes an animal´s or a tree´s loss”, we could have all 
agreed. The point is that Montaigne´s statement refers to human interaction in all possible 
circumstances.6 He never does, nor does he intend to refer to animals or plants. 
Mises would indeed have disagreed with Montero Kuscevic and del Río Rivera ´s 
statement in support of Montaigne, that “[i]n short, all production is, in some sense, a 
destruction of the natural world, although this destruction is also part of nature” (p. 339). 
From the human perspective, “production is creative” not destructive (Mises 1949, p. 141). 
Production transforms “the original factors – both human and nonhuman – into means” 
(Mises 1998, p. 142). It may be a negative view on production that has caused Montero 
Kuscevic and del Río Rivera and others to believe that Montaigne´s dogma holds sometimes 
in the unhampered economy.  
In short, Montaigne´s statement applies exclusively to interpersonal exchanges. Mises 
takes issue only with Montaigne´s belief that in voluntary exchanges one gains at the expense 
of another and terms this error the Montaigne dogma. There seems to be no misinterpretation 
of Montaigne’s core tenets from Mises´ side.  
As for the second alleged misinterpretation by Mises, Montero Kuscevic and del Río 
Rivera write:  
 
                                                        
6 Schaefer points out that Montaigne´s work is a “portrait of human nature in general” (1983, p. 286, emphasis 
added).  
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The second mistake made by Mises had to do with his training. Mises was basically an 
economist… He interpreted the gain (or profit) in a monetary-economic sense, even 
though the text of Montaigne uses the word 'gain' in a much broader perspective to 
mean prestige, honor, power, and influence. As an economist, Mises was mainly 
concerned with the creation of wealth, and interpreted the phrase ´the gain of one man 
is the damage of another´ in a strictly economic sense. (p. 340) 
 
Mises studied law and government science in Vienna at the turn of the 20th century.7 His 
academic training was much broader and more interdisciplinary than what is offered in a 
typical economics degree today, which may indeed regard profit narrowly as only monetary in 
nature.8 Mises was a social scientist. He wrote on epistemology, methodology, sociology, law, 
history and, most commonly, praxeology, the general theory of human action. He considered 
economics to be the “hitherto best-developed branch” of praxeology (1949, p. 881). He was 
not a narrow-minded economist looking only at monetary exchanges and wealth creation, as 
Montero Kuscevic and del Río Rivera suggest.  
Moreover, Mises refers not to monetary profits, but to “entrepreneurial profit and loss” 
(1949, p. 660). For Mises, “[p]rofit, in a broader sense, is the gain derived from action; it is 
the increase in satisfaction (decrease in uneasiness) brought about…To make profit is 
invariably the aim sought by any action” (ibid., p. 286). Furthermore, entrepreneurial profit 
for Mises is not restricted to “strictly economic” actions, as Montero Kuscevic and del Río 
Rivera seem to believe, but applies to all human actions; Profit is not just a monetary or 
economic phenomenon. For Mises “[p]rofit and loss in this original sense are psychic 
phenomena…” (ibid., p. 287). In all voluntary exchanges both parties expect to “profit” (i.e., 
                                                        
7 For the most extensive biography of Mises, see Hülsmann (2007). 
8 Though it would be only the poor student of economics who would make this mistake. The distinction between 
accounting profits reckoned in monetary terms and economic profits involving opportunity costs is stressed in all 
leading introductory textbooks (e.g., Mankiw 1998, p. 272; Varian 1987, p. 346). 
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benefit) ex ante. Exchanges are mutually beneficial in a psychic sense. It is from this 
theoretical background that Mises takes issue with Montaigne who believes voluntary 
exchanges represent a zero-sum game: the gain of one must be the loss of another.  
 
Final Remarks 
Mises is correct when he criticizes the belief that voluntary market transactions are a zero-
sum game. He is also correct to attribute this belief to Montaigne and to term it the Montaigne 
dogma, since Montaigne believes that in all exchanges, voluntary or not, one party benefits at 
the cost of another. It is true as Montero Kuscevic and del Río Rivera point out that 
Montaigne is largely considered a skeptic and for a skeptic an absolute statement such as a 
dogma seems not to fit (p. 340), yet possible inconsistencies in Montaigne´s writings are not 
Mises´ fault.9 
The Misesian concept of profit and loss is not a constrained monetary-economic 
notion, but rather a broader reaching psychic concept that applies to all human action. Mises 
interprets gain in a similar sense to Montaigne. It seems to us that in light of the evidence, 
Mises was not unfair to Montaigne but rather that Montero Kuscevic and del Río Rivera have 
been unfair to Mises.  
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